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The Influence of Foreign Direct Investment on Accommodation Patterns in 
Vietnam as a Result of the Open Door Policy  
 
Abstract 
Before the “open door” policy doi moi, the Vietnamese government had monopolised all sectors 
of tourism in the country. In 1987, one year after the beginning of doi moi, the state issued the 
Law on Foreign Investment, which encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam, 
especially in the tourism industry. This paper examines the influence of the resulting influx of 
foreign direct investment on tourism accommodation patterns in Vietnam. A synopsis of policy 
and background of FDI in Vietnam accommodation is followed by an examination of 
developments, projects and experiences in this field since doi moi. The paper then investigates 
the effects of FDI in Vietnam tourism accommodation on developments and practices in 
Vietnam’s accommodation market, including the traditional state-owned accommodation sub-
sector. The paper integrates insights gained from interviews with operators of joint-venture and 
state-owned hotels in Vietnam. 
 
Keywords: foreign direct investment, doi moi, tourism accommodation, tourism management, 
Vietnam. 
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Vietnam’s Open Door Policy 
 
Doi Moi 
 
In 1986, the Congress of Vietnam introduced an economic programme called doi moi 
(Renovation), which has been compared to Gorbachev’s contemporaneous glasnost campaign in 
the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese Communist Party’s new policy called for measures including 
the decentralisation of the planning system, a decrease in the number of government ministries 
and bureaucracies, reliance on the private sector as an engine of economic growth, and allowing 
state and privately-owned industries to trade directly in foreign and international markets. Doi 
moi has succeeded remarkably in moving the country from a stagnant, centrally planned Soviet-
style economy with macroeconomic instability to a socialist-oriented mixed market-oriented 
economy characterised by rapid growth (Kokko, 1998: 2). Developments such as the end of the 
US trade embargo on Vietnam in 1994, Vietnam’s 1995 entry into ASEAN, and Vietnam’s 
admission to the WTO in 2007 indicate an increasing re-integration of Vietnam into international 
markets. 
 
Doi Moi and Tourism 
 
With these political and economic shifts, Vietnam has become a much more accessible and 
attractive destination in the international tourism market and has been rediscovered by tourists 
from around the world. Consequently, Vietnam’s tourism industry has experienced a period of 
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meteoric growth in recent years. Over 4.1 million international tourists arrived in Vietnam in 
2007, an increase of over ten-fold since 1990 (www.vietnamtourism.com/e_pages/news/ 
index.asp?loai=2&uid=6751).  Tourism accommodation and travel agencies in Vietnam earned a 
total of 10,743.5 billion dong (USD 670 million) in 2004, compared to 4,458.5 billion dong 
(USD 280 million) in 2000 (www.gso.gov.vn). It has been predicted that earnings from foreign 
visitors to Vietnam in 2010 will reach USD 11.8 billion (Sadi and Henderson, 2001: 70). As of 
2006, an estimated 234,000 people worked in Vietnam’s tourism sector, with another 510,000 
jobs in related industries (John, 2006). Aside from this quantifiable growth, tourism in Vietnam 
has also changed in character during the years since 1986. Vietnam’s tourism industry is 
experiencing the emergence of new tourism niches, new kinds of attractions and businesses, new 
breeds of tourists and unfamiliar types of tourism such as eco-tourism and war tourism. Far from 
being merely a side-effect of economic and political changes in Vietnam, growth and change in 
the tourism sector has also generated effects that have an influence on politics, economics and 
Vietnamese society in general.  
 
The current Socio-Economic Strategy of Vietnam for the years 2001-2010 continues the doi moi 
programme and sets out goals for the further improvement of the country in all its facets. This 
paper discusses the development of foreign direct investment in the accommodation sector in the 
context of doi moi as an ongoing process. It contains insights gained through interviews with 
various figures of responsibility in government and the tourism industry, both public and private, 
who have experienced the development of FDI in within Vietnam’s evolving transition economy. 
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Methodology 
 
Challenges and Limitations 
 
Research in Vietnam is still associated with certain problems, and there is relatively little 
published research on tourism in Vietnam. The English language literature on this subject is very 
limited. The authors also found that most government organisations are either not willing to 
share information and documents, or that the statistics in question do not exist or were never 
recorded (Henderson, 2000; Lloyd et al, 2004). 
 
Many researchers and scholars have referred to this lack of reliable and accurate basic statistical 
information data for Vietnam, and in addition, the country lacks continuous historical data on the 
development of tourism (Lloyd, 2004; Lloyd et al, 2004; Mok and Lam, 1998; EIU, 1993; 
Henderson, 2000; Theuns, 1997). Insufficient standardisation or coordination of measuring 
periods and time spans from province to province or from year to year, inadequate training, 
resources and interdepartmental coordination are all likely contribute to this problem, as does 
increasing forgery, smuggling and falsification of documents to meet a growing demand by 
researchers and organisations for data that may not exist in the form required (Lloyd et al, 2004). 
It has been said that the open door policy has seemingly brought Vietnam’s communist 
government to realise the need to improve the reliability and availability of data in order to 
attract potential foreign investors who need trustworthy and consistent statistics as a basis for 
their development strategies (EIU, 1993; Mok and Lam, 1998). The Statistical Office in Ho Chi 
Minh City plans to undertake a greater number of surveys and research in tourism and publish a 
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greater variety of tourism statistics in their yearbooks (Interview with Director of Statistics 
Office, Ho Chi Minh City).  
 
This study investigates changes in tourism that occurred during the first years of the twenty first 
century. However, some of the data referenced in this paper comes from the period between the 
beginning of doi moi and the turn of the century, in order to provide a context for the 
developments that led in to this situation. Political and financial events of recent years make it 
difficult to extrapolate the trends identified in this paper into subsequent years or the future. 
 
Choice of Methods 
 
The use of key interviews was chosen as the principal method of gathering data for this paper, 
and the research combines a series of interviews conducted by the lead author with 
administrative figures in two international hotel chains, seven state owned hotels and three 
guesthouses at different locations in Vietnam. These were supplemented with interviews with a 
senior expert in hotels from the Vietnam National Administration of Tourism (VNAT) and a 
senior official of the Foreign Investment Agency, Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). 
Desk research from secondary sources including government documents, newspapers and 
periodicals supplemented the information gathered from the interviews. 
 
Firms, organisations and individuals that have been active in Vietnam tourism from before doi 
moi were primarily sought out for interviews, in order to get insight into patterns over a longer 
period of time, even before the beginning of doi moi. Because of the government monopoly on 
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tourism businesses before 1986, state-owned hotels and firms in Vietnam tended to be the 
longest-established and thus were specially targeted for interviews. Interviewees were also 
chosen from foreign firms, FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and other private enterprises that 
have been operating in Vietnam since at least the beginning of the development of private and 
FDI enterprises in Vietnam tourism as part of doi moi. To gain an understanding of tourism 
policy changes from the vantage point of the makers and enforcers of this policy, interviews 
were also conducted with representatives of government bodies. 
 
A semi-structured interview form was used, involving the implementation of a number of pre-
determined questions and/or special topics, asked of each interviewee in a consistent and 
systematic order, but allowing the interviewer sufficient freedom to digress in order to probe 
beyond the immediate answers to the predetermined questions. New issues often arose during an 
interview, which led the interviewer to ask additional questions to probe a certain direction.  
Such questions varied among interviewees. One examples of this is a line of questioning 
regarding hotel room prices that revealed patterns in changes of accommodation development, 
supply and demand since the beginning of doi moi. 
 
Multiple lines of questioning of different interviewees at different levels or sectors were used to 
validate and cross-check interview results, such as the interviewing of private, state-owned and 
international operators as well as representatives of the VNAT regarding the development of the 
accommodation sector. Representatives of government bodies were often in a position to verify 
the results of interviews with representatives of tourism businesses and data from other primary 
sources. 
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Contribution  
 
A 2004 survey of representatives of the investment promotion agencies of more than 50 nations 
(most of them developing countries) determined that tourism is one of the main industries being 
targeted by these countries for FDI (Endo, 2006: 601). While dealing specifically with Vietnam, 
this paper contributes to knowledge on investment in the developing world in general, and 
socialist countries in particular. It offers specific insights into the ways in which the introduction 
of aspects of a free market economy into a socialist system affects the risks and opportunities for 
investment. Through the use of elite interviews, the research gives an understanding of how such 
a broad macro-economic transition affects, and is affected by, individual tourism operators. It 
goes beyond the discussion of the purely economic and political aspects of the investment 
climate within political transition to reveal the workings of mechanisms of knowledge transfer 
and cultural negotiation between public and private, domestic and foreign, established and start-
up interests in this context. 
 
FDI/Joint Ventures in Vietnam 
 
Legal Framework 
 
In 1987, a new foreign investment law was inaugurated, encouraging foreign investment by 
offering enticing conditions for joint enterprises and foreign-owned corporations.  The Law on 
Foreign Investment opened the Vietnamese market to investment by foreign firms and persons 
and guaranteed them rights of ownership and fair treatment including freedom from 
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expropriation and nationalization of assets. In order to encourage opportunities for transfer of 
capital and expertise, the law favours joint ventures over the other models of foreign investment 
(Ngo Ba Thanh, 1993: 95).  The duration of foreign investment in a project was originally 
limited to 20 years.  
 
A June 30, 1990 amendment to the 1987 Law made it possible for private joint-stock limited 
liability organizations to enter into joint ventures with foreign firms for the first time. This 
provision was extended by a second amendment on December 23, 1992 to include private 
companies. This same amendment also extended the maximum allowable duration of operation 
of foreign-funded firms in Vietnam to 70 years. Vietnamese partners are allowed to contribute 
only 25 to 30 per cent of the capital for such projects, with a provision for a gradual increase in 
capital share over time (Le Van Sang, 1995: 121). Other amendments followed in 1996, 2000 
and 2003. According to a Senior Official of the Foreign Investment Agency (FIA) of the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), in 1996 the Foreign Investment Agency carried out 
its first study and SWOT analysis comparing Vietnam’s investment law to other countries in an 
effort to learn how Vietnam could attract more FDI. Before this, no need was seen for surveys or 
research. 
 
Foreign investment is allowed in all economic sectors but specifically encouraged in several 
specific niches, among them ‘foreign exchange earning services’ such as ship repair, air- and 
seaport services and tourism (Theuns, 1997: 312). In the original version of the Law, foreign 
firms were to be liable to pay tax on their profits at a rate of between five and ten per cent, 
though tax exemption could be granted in special cases to encourage investment (Law on 
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Foreign Investment, 1987: Article 33). The only areas from which foreign investment was 
explicitly excluded by the Law on Foreign Investment were those related to national security 
(Wayne and Lejeune, 1996: 203). 
 
Early Development of FDI 
 
In the period 1987 to 1995, foreign investment in Vietnam totaled USD 20.63 billion. By 1996, 
FDI in Vietnam was the second highest of any country in the world, as a percentage of GDP 
(Freeman, 2002: 5). According to Vasavakul, in the mid 1990s tourism was the most popular 
sector for foreign investment, accounting for over USD 3.3 billion. (1997: 348). Investors from 
64 nations, invested in Vietnam up to the end of 2003. Most foreign investment came from Asian 
countries (Leproux and Brooks, 2004: 2). 
 
However, in 1996, FDI declined for the first time since doi moi was adopted, and economic 
growth dropped to 4 per cent. Analysts have commented that some aspects of the Renovation 
Program are nothing more than empty rhetoric on the part of the government, and foreign 
investors may have come to the realization that the country’s political climate may not have been 
as open as was originally assumed as shown, by the 1996 campaign to abolish ‘social evils’ 
which called for the prohibition of signs in foreign languages (Batha, 2000). Many internal 
factors may also have contributed to Vietnam’s economic downturn, such as an excess of 
bureaucracy, which discouraged investment, a complicated and opaque system of rules and 
regulations, widespread corruption in the government and banking systems and favouritism for 
thousands of dysfunctional State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Thayer, 2000). The downturn in 
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FDI was exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The most fundamental obstacle for 
foreign investors was the Hanoi government itself (Hines, 2000), which had introduced doi moi 
in 1986 “not out of altruism, but because its hand was forced” (Mitton, 1998). The VCP has been 
accused of having taken two steps forward and one step back (ibid).  
 
Encouraging FDI 
 
In order to encourage investors from countries from outside the region, in 1998 the Agency 
carried out a promotion campaign in European countries for investment in Vietnam (Interview, 
A, 2004). A 1999 ruling allowed foreign investors to own a stake of up to 30 per cent in so-
called ‘equitized’ state-owned enterprises in several sectors, including hotels (The Saigon Times 
Daily, 1999). In 2005, there was more than USD 2 billion of foreign direct investment in 
Vietnam, or 4 per cent of Vietnam’s GDP (ADB, 2006: 8). 
 
Encouraging FDI is a central concern behind market-oriented policy reforms in Vietnam. FDI is 
seen as a catalyst for economic transition and revitalization of the private economic sector (ADB, 
2006: 10). Yasheng (2001, cited in Freeman, 2002: 8) pointed out that FDI has served as a sort of 
“ersatz private sector” in China, which, like Vietnam, has a transitional economy, associated 
with a low-level of domestic private economic development and a sluggish public sector. 
Vietnam’s bountiful natural resources and low labor rates, as well as the relatively high 
education level and pronounced work ethic of the Vietnamese people, contribute to the 
attractiveness of the country for foreign investors (Freeman, 2002: 4). However, encouraging 
foreign investment in Vietnam proved difficult because of a lack of technological capability and 
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managerial experience in the country. The infrastructure, destroyed during the War, was in a 
sorry state. The press criticized the administration for having difficulty in abandoning the 
‘guerrilla mentality’ and making the transition from a wartime to a peacetime society (Duiker, 
1995: 145). Growth in the private sector and foreign direct investment (FDI) were concentrated 
mainly in the South, where better infrastructure, longer personal and business relations with 
Vietnamese and Chinese abroad, and a supportive local administration created a more favorable 
environment than in the North (Dodsworth, et al, 1996: 16). Despite improvements in its 
investment climate, Vietnam remains less investor-friendly than other countries in Southeast 
Asia, and Vietnam is still not regarded as an economically progressive environment. In 1995, the 
country ranked 98th out of 100 rated nations in terms of economic freedom. By 2005, it had only 
progressed to 142nd out of 157. FDI in Vietnam also still tends to concentrate on the principal 
cities, in part because transport, infrastructure and administrative services are much less 
developed in the rest of the country (ADB, 2006: 34, 46). For example, between 1988 and 2003, 
19 per cent of FDI in Vietnam was in Hanoi and 26 per cent in Ho Chi Minh City (Leproux and 
Brooks, 2004: 2). Vietnam’s great success in attracting FDI in spite of these hindrances attests to 
the high prospective gains to be made in the country or the value of establishing oneself early 
within an emerging market, for which firms are apparently currently willing to accept a high 
level of risk and constraints, at least for the present. 
 
Contribution of FDI 
 
Retrospective assessments of the significance of the contribution of FDI to the Vietnamese 
economy vary, according to which indicator is cited. At the end of the 1990s, foreign direct 
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investment companies accounted for 13 per cent of Vietnam’s GDP, 27 per cent of its non-oil 
exports, 35 per cent of industrial production and one-quarter of tax revenues. In the year 2000, 
the total revenues from FDI in Vietnam were USD 6.5 billion and tax income from FDIs was 
USD 280 million (Freeman, 2002: 3). However, the FDI sector accounted for only a small 
proportion of total employment in the country: 2 per cent in 2000 and 0.6 per cent overall 
between 1991 and 2000 (Leproux and Brooks, 2004: 12). In 2001, the World Bank estimated that 
average total investment in Vietnam would have to attain a level of 30 percent of the GDP by 
2010 (5 percent higher than in the 1990s). A government reform program aims at reducing state 
sector investment to encourage investment from the private sector (Tenev, et al., 2003: 1-2). 
Preliminary figures from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam for 2007 show that foreign 
direct investment capital accounts for about 129 trillion dong, or about 24.8 percent of total 
investment capital in the country. This is an increase of 193 percent from the 2006 FDI amount 
(http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=471&idmid=3). 
 
The Foreign Investment Law allows for foreign investment in Vietnam in the form of a business 
corporate contract (BCC), a joint venture or fully foreign-invested properties. In 1998, it was 
noted that most foreign investors still preferred to have Vietnamese partners who are familiar 
with the Vietnamese way of doing things (Li, et al, 1998). However, six years later, foreign 
investors had gained enough experience in Vietnam to feel confident enough to avoid the 
complications of domestic partners by increasingly deciding for 100 per cent ownership of their 
projects. 
 
FDI in tourism in Vietnam 
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Twenty per cent of the USD 30 billion of FDI pledged to Vietnam between 1988 and 1997 was 
designated for tourism (Sadi and Henderson, 2001: 71). FDI in tourism in Vietnam grew from 
USD 7.4 million (2 per cent of total FDI) in 1988 to USD 1.9 billion (30.7 per cent of total FDI) 
in 1995, increasing by around 100 per cent yearly. The number of projects remained more or less 
constant, but the average size of projects undertaken grew steadily from year to year, from USD 
1.4 million in 1988 to USD 66.7 million in 1995. An increase in the average duration of tourism 
FDI projects from 9 years to 27 years over the same period reflects the growth in the size of 
projects undertaken and also indicates an increase in investor confidence in the Vietnam tourism 
market. Accounting for USD 1.3 billion in funds, Taiwan was by far the largest source of the 
investment in Vietnamese tourism in the eight years from 1988 to 1995 (Erramilli, et al, 1997: 
277-278). 
 
The decline in FDI in Vietnam from 1996 has been especially pronounced in the hospitality and 
tourism sectors, where slow return on investment, complicated procedures and the communist 
government’s “culture of secrecy” have served to disillusion many foreign investors (Sadi and 
Henderson, 2001: 78-80). To this day, a number of barriers and pitfalls for foreign direct 
investment still exist in Vietnam. Besides the general hurdles to FDI already discussed in this 
paper, tourism projects are especially dependent on infrastructure, and tend to suffer from 
lagging infrastructure improvements, such as the promised but not-yet-built international airport 
on Phu Quoc Island, on which the future tourism development potential of the island will rely. 
The lack of trustworthy market figures for Vietnam and continuing prevalence of opaque, 
inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy are further complications and sources of discouragement 
(Sadi and Henderson, 2001: 78-80). 
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Some FDI-invested sites, such as Phu Quoc Island, which developers plan to turn into a world-
class ecotourism destination, are eligible to apply for the highest preferential policies allowed by 
the Vietnamese government (http://investphuquoc.com/investment.html) including expediting 
license procedures and establishing a Phu Quoc Investment and Development Management 
Board to assist investors (http://english.vietnamnet.vn/biz/2008/08/800352/). Some of the 
twenty-one projects on the island with a total revenue of USD 1.72 billion are already 
contributing to a 16 percent annual economic growth rate on the island for the past three years 
(http://www.vietnamtourism.gov.vn).  
 
FDI / Joint Ventures in the Tourism Accommodation Sector 
 
Overview 
 
Hoping to encourage tourism to the country, the Vietnamese government declared 1990 “Visit 
Vietnam Year”. This ambitious program is considered by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
(1993) to have failed due to a shortage of hotel rooms, among other factors. Some hotels 
remaining from the French colonial era had been transformed to different uses or allowed to fall 
into disrepair, and the standard of Vietnam’s accommodation provisions was seen as inadequate 
for the international tourists who began to return after 1986, due to the lack of integrated 
entertainment and recreation facilities to supplement room and board (VNAT/UNDP/WTO, 
1991: 22). Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, accommodation of international standard in 
Vietnam was very limited (VNAT/UNDP/WTO, 2001: 39). The EIU reported that in 1989 there 
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were 18,877 rooms in accommodation units in Vietnam (1993: 69), but a UNDP and WTO 
document identified only 1,565 rooms that met international standards in 1990 
(VNAT/UNDP/WTO, 1991: 20). These figures are indicative and not absolute, as the accuracy 
and reliability of data on tourism in Vietnam is notoriously weak (EIU, 1993; Theuns, 1997; 
Biles, et al, 1999;Travel Business Analyst, 1992: 21; VNAT/UNDP/WTO, 2001: 44). 
 
Until doi moi, the Vietnamese government was the only provider of tourist accommodation in 
the country, but now state enterprises no longer hold a monopoly and private and foreign 
investors have also become involved. As a result of the shortfalls mentioned above, the 
Vietnamese government became more aware of the importance of tourism infrastructure and 
sought to spur development by prioritizing joint venture investment in tourism (EIU, 1993: 63). 
Since the Vietnamese government and domestic sector lacked the knowledge and financial 
means to develop a progressive hospitality sector unassisted, the State Committee for 
Cooperation and Investment (SCCI) looked favorably on granting approval to foreign investment 
proposals for hotel development (ibid). A senior official of FIA stated that large foreign hotel 
chains also attracted their own loyal customers to Vietnam, bringing foreign exchange income 
into the country (Interview A, 2004). Priority was put on refurbishing existing hotels to raise 
their standards. Hotel renovations were among the largest joint venture projects in terms of funds 
invested (Theuns, 1997: 314). 
 
Hotel development accounted for most of the tourism FDI in the early to mid 1990s, ranging 
from 57.5 per cent to 99.4 per cent of the yearly total (Erramilli, et al, 1997: 280). Hotel 
development was one of three major investment areas that together made up 83 per cent of total 
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foreign investment in 1992 (the other two were industry and oil/gas) (EIU, 1993: 63). By 2004, 
239 FDI tourism projects had been registered in Vietnam, with total capital of USD 6.1 billion 
(Vietnam New Agency, 2004). 
 
Pioneering FDI / Joint Venture Projects in Vietnam 
 
For as long as FDI has been permitted in the Vietnamese accommodation sector, joint-venture 
hotels have played a driving role in raising the standards, scale and prices in Vietnam’s 
hospitality industry in general. The following examples illustrate the type of enterprise that has 
been developed under these arrangements. 
 
Constructed in Singapore in 1987 and originally sited at Australia’s Great Barrier Reef (World 
Maritime News, 11 April, 1997), the 200-room Saigon Floating Hotel was towed to Ho Chi 
Minh City and opened in December 1989 by Southern Pacific Hotels as a joint venture between 
Australian and Filipino interests and the Vietnamese Overseas Finance and Trade Corporation 
(OCFC) (Abbott and Abbott, 1996: 193; Travel Business Analyst, 1992: 19), becoming the only 
five-star international standard hotel in the city. Many of the hotel’s facilities and features, such 
as international direct dial phone lines, international booking, a business centre and credit card 
facilities, were unique in Ho Chi Minh City at that time. By 1990, three-quarters of the hotel’s 
rooms were rented by foreigners on a long-stay basis (Saigon Tourist and Saigon Tourist 
Association, 1990: 31, EIU, 1993: 68). The OCFC functioned as the ‘facilitator’ to help the 
project over bureaucratic hurdles and received full power of attorney for the project plus an 
annual fee of USD 750,000 and 15 per cent of profits (Travel Business Analyst, 1992: 20). The 
waterborne structure evaded the ban on foreign ownership of land and became an instant 
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sensation in the city, although Vietnamese were not allowed to enter. When it first opened, 
people set up seats on the bank and charged VND 500 per half-hour for a place to sit and watch 
the hotel (Biles, et al, 1999: 224). The Floating Hotel ceased operating in August 1996 and was 
towed to a dry dock in Singapore (http://www.kurtwalter.net/the-saigon-floating-hotel.htm). It 
was subsequently bought by the Hyundai corporation and is now located in North Korea. 
 
The joint venture Century Saigon Hotel opened on July 29, 1992 and had a 75 per cent 
occupancy rate in its first six months. The hotel’s initial average room rate (ARR) was USD 108, 
comparable to the Floating Hotel’s concurrent ARR of USD 110. In comparison, the Rex Hotel 
charged USD 60 per night, the Continental USD 85, the Saigon Star USD 78, the Norfolk USD 
75 and the Chains First Hotel USD 43. Century International Hotels targeted an ARR of USD 
123 for 1993 and USD 138 for 1994 (Militante, 1993).  The lack of four and five-star 
accommodation in Vietnam in the early 1990s allowed hotels in this class to charge room rates of 
around USD 150 by 1993 (Michael, 1993).  
 
The New World Saigon Hotel, constructed as a joint venture between a state-owned enterprise 
and a Hong Kong investor, opened in 1994. With 552 rooms in its 14 storeys, it was the largest 
hotel in Vietnam and boasted quite possibly the first escalators in the city. The project was self-
financed, thus circumventing the ban on syndicated loans imposed by the US trade embargo. 
Three-quarters of the USD 62.5 million budget was contributed by the Hong Kong investor New 
World, with Saigontourist Holding Company covering the balance (Michael, 1993). 
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By 2001, many of the large international hotel chains had opened hotels in Vietnam, with many 
of the hotels in the biggest cities being operated by Vietnamese/foreign joint ventures 
(VNAT/UNDP/WTO, 2001: 41). In 2000, 182 of the 194 foreign-invested hotel and tourism 
projects were joint ventures, with 6 each of 100 per cent foreign-funded projects and business 
cooperation contracts. As of 2006, a US investor plans to build a USD 1 billion five-star 
international standard resort and entertainment on Phu Quoc Island (Phu Quoc Island Snares 1 
Billion USD Resort, 2006). In this same year, there were 190 FDI tourism projects in Vietnam 
with capital of USD 4.64 billion. The VinaLand Fund of the investment bank VinaCapital, 
acquired a 70 per cent stake in the Sofitel Metropole Hotel in 2005 and a 52.5 per cent stake in 
the Hilton Hanoi Opera in 2006, and is planning a further USD 43 million of investment in 
tourism projects in Hanoi and USD 3.1 million in a golf resort in Danang. The International 
Hotel Group, the world’s largest accommodation operator, plans to open its first hotel in 
Vietnam in 2009 (John, 2006). 
 
The Roles of Foreign and Domestic Partners in FDI / Joint Venture Hotel Projects 
 
The infusion of money and knowledge into the Vietnamese tourism industry are obvious 
contributions by foreign partners in FDI ventures. The General Director of the Huong Giang 
Tourist Co., for example, has declared that co-operation with foreign companies helps local 
operators to improve on the quality of their services, thus raising their competitiveness (Vietnam 
News Agency, 2006). Aside from bringing the financing, know-how, experience and industry 
connections to joint-venture projects, foreign partners in joint-venture hotel projects have been 
active in encouraging the government to take a progressive stance on other facets of the tourism 
sector. For instance, according to a member of the European Chamber of Commerce, 
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organizations such as the European Chamber of Commerce, the American Chamber of 
Commerce and the Hotel Association in Ho Chi Minh City were instrumental in persuading the 
government to lift visa requirements for Japanese tourists to encourage foreign investment by 
boosting traffic, and they have been working on similar initiatives for American and European 
visitors (Interview B, 2004).  
 
Although unable to contribute much in the way of capital, Vietnamese partners in joint ventures 
contribute in other ways. All land is owned by the Vietnamese central government but can be 
leased, though buildings on the land may be privately owned. Vietnamese interests will often 
provide the land for joint venture projects. Sometimes government departments enter into joint 
ventures with foreign firms by making land under their control available for development. The 
Pullman Metropole Hotel in Hanoi was upgraded to four-star status by a French/Japanese joint 
venture in which the Vietnamese building contractor Jeals received a 20 per cent share in 
exchange for contributing construction labour and materials (EIU, 1993: 69-70). Domestic 
partners are also more familiar with navigating the Vietnamese and legal processes and more 
able to anticipate and adapt to the rapid changes that characterize transition-era Vietnam 
(Magnier, 1992). 
 
An ‘unwritten law’ which gives the minority shareholder the same control and rights as the 
majority partner gives Vietnamese firms an added incentive to team up with foreign investors. 
The inequity of this provision is one of a number of difficulties met by foreign firms wishing to 
enter into joint ventures in Vietnam. Once the firm has surmounted the initial hurdle of finding 
an appropriate local partner, an agreement must be reached that satisfies not only the two 
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partners, but also the government, which may demand substantial revisions before granting 
approval (Militante, 1993). Even when an agreement is reached with the national-level 
governmental bodies, there is no guarantee that the provincial authorities will let a project go 
ahead (Interview B, 2004).  
 
Improvements in conditions for FDI in Vietnam Tourism 
 
The adoption of the Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement, Vietnam’s new membership in the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area and joining of the World Trade Organization were cited as reasons for 
instituting changes in conditions for FDI in Vietnam (Vietnam to Adopt Common Investment 
Law, 2003; Interview A, 2004), as was the general goal of achieving competitiveness through a 
free market, including the need to remain competitive with other developing countries like India 
and China (Interview A, 2004). Foreign operators of hotels in Vietnam interviewed by the lead 
author remarked on the increased ease of operation resulting from the relaxation of restrictions 
on banking and visa matters, and some investors who failed in earlier endeavours in Vietnam are 
now confident enough to return for a second try. 
 
Foreign investors in Vietnam’s accommodation sector have been making progress in their 
collaborations and communications with government and other operators in the tourism sector. 
The General Manager of an international hotel mentioned that the government organizes official 
conferences twice a year, at which government representatives meet with representatives of most 
of the foreign investment companies involved in joint ventures, to discuss and debate policy. 
These hotels also collaborate with local partners such as Vietnam Airlines and Saigontourist, to 
promote Vietnam as a destination (Interview C, 2004).  However, a General Manager of a five 
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star joint-venture hotel noted that government-organized meetings happen on a very ad hoc 
basis, with notifications and invitations to large events like a road show in Korea coming just 
two weeks before the actual event (Interview B, 2004). 
 
State-Owned Accommodation 
 
Overview 
 
The majority of new hotels developed in Vietnam are state-owned, in many cases as part of joint 
ventures with foreign investors (VNAT/UNDP/WTO, 2001: 45). Most of these are owned by 
city and provincial tourism bodies, for whom they provide a major source of income, especially 
in the larger cities. (Travel Business Analyst, 1992: 13). It was estimated that 60 per cent of the 
one- to five-star grade hotels and 65 per cent of all hotel rooms in Vietnam in 2001 belonged to 
state owned enterprises (SOEs), owned by state bodies at levels from the national ministries 
down to the district or commune level. It has been argued that the predominance of state 
ownership of hotels results in a type of built-in government regulation in the accommodation 
industry (VNAT/UNDP/WTO, 2001: 109, 159), but the diversification of this control over so 
many levels and bodies of government can never be expected to achieve the homogenous 
policies possible with a centrally controlled market. 
 
Ties to the cumbersome government bureaucracy can prove a handicap for state-owned hotels. 
One executive of a state-owned hotel mentioned that time-sensitive initiatives like publicity 
campaigns can be wrecked by the long wait for government approval of the campaign (Interview 
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D, 2004). Interviewees gave mixed responses as to the degree of autonomy that the General 
Managers of state-owned hotels are granted. While one reported that he was free to make all day-
to-day decisions in the running of his hotel without consulting a higher authority, another 
remarked that even the smallest of renovations cannot be authorized by the hotel manager 
without the funding and approval of the local government Labour Department. Although even 
managers themselves are not always sure in which cases they must ask permission and in which 
cases they are free to exercise their own discretion, in general any physical alteration to a 
building requires government approval. Several General Managers stated that government 
financial support for state-owned hotels for the most part has been withdrawn and each hotel 
must attract its own guests, organize its own financing and ensure its own profitability. 
 
Challenges posed by FDI / Joint venture hotels 
 
The recent proliferation of foreign joint venture hotels poses a challenge for existing non-joint-
venture state-owned hotels, which must now compete against hotels in quantity and quality that 
did not exist in their market before doi moi. In response, some hotels have established sales or 
marketing departments where previously a reservation department was deemed sufficient 
(Interview D, E, F, G, 2004). The first sales department in a state-owned hotel was set up by the 
Majestic Hotel in Ho Chi Minh City in 1995, in direct response to the stiff competition brought 
by the highly profitable joint-venture Floating Hotel and Omni Saigon Hotel. These hotels served 
as both the impetus and the model for progressive management thinking in the state-owned 
hotels that were their direct competitors. The Director of Sales and Marketing at a state-owned 
hotel freely admits to learning about pricing and promotion from the hotel’s joint-venture rivals. 
Contrarily, a VNAT official denied that joint-venture hotels have had any effect on state-owned 
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hotels perhaps indicative of the degree to which state-owned hotels have assumed their own 
autonomy and must solve their own problems, which may not even be acknowledged at the 
governmental level (Interview F, K, 2004). 
 
Several General Managers of state-owned hotels acknowledged that with their global reach and 
experience and economies of scale, joint-venture hotels are able to offer bonuses such as 
discounts at their other hotels, and are more able to deal with international bookings and 
tracking-down of non-paying guests. Restricted in their scope to ventures inside of Vietnam, 
state-owned hotels cannot compete in these aspects. 
 
Some state-owned hotels still rely heavily on government bodies to provide them with guests. 
The Sapa Trade Union Hotel in Sapa in the North of Vietnam, for instance, caters mainly to 
domestic tourists including, as its name implies, trade union tour groups (Interview H, 2004). 
Such arrangements provide dedicated distribution channels for marketing as well as a steady 
source of clients. However, most state-owned hotels must compete in the same market as foreign 
and domestic private enterprises for the same pool of customers. Because state ownership of 
hotels is most prevalent among Vietnam’s star-rated hotels, this requires that they predominantly 
address the foreign tourist market and interviewees expressed the expansion of their foreign 
customer base as an important goal. 
 
Having previously received guests primarily from Eastern bloc countries, state-owned hotels 
must adjust to the higher standards of service and facilities expected by the Western travellers 
who make up an increasing number of their customers since 1986. Many older urban hotels 
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dropped their Vietnamese names and reverted to their Western-sounding pre-1975 names after 
doi moi (Travel Business Analyst, 1992: 26), apparently to appeal to the foreign market. The Dan 
Chu Hotel in Hanoi, for example, receives around 75 per cent foreign guests and 25 per cent 
domestic. The Deputy General Manager of a state owned hotel in Hanoi has said that the concept 
of guest-oriented thinking was unknown to the hotel management before 1993. Until that time, 
occupancy had been guaranteed by an undersupply of hotel rooms, and the government could be 
counted on to provide subsidies. With increasing competition and the slow withdrawal of 
government support, his hotel began to accept credit cards in 1995 and a policy of seasonal 
pricing was adopted for the first time in 1998 (Interview G, 2004). Executives at state-owned 
hotels have intimated that a lower room rate or special offers apply for Vietnamese guests, and 
that domestic tourists are targeted more aggressively during the low season for international 
tourism. 
 
Responses to challenges 
 
Low price was often mentioned by the interviewees as one distinct advantage that state-owned 
hotels still retain against the joint-venture competition, to offset their lower standards of facilities 
and service. This price differential is partly a function of lower operating budgets due to lower 
provision of facilities and service and the hiring of local staff rather than foreigners. State hotel 
managers interviewed have said that they would very much like to hire foreign staff for higher 
positions in their hotels, in order to bring in foreign experience and attract foreign business, but 
cost is a severe limitation. One manager has said that she would have to pay a foreigner USD 
1,000 to 2,000 a month for a position in which a Vietnamese would earn USD 400 to 500 
(Interview F, 2004). The management of two of the hotels at which interviews were conducted 
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decided to hire a single foreigner in an attempt to attract more foreign trade. Interestingly, in both 
cases the foreigner hired was a food and beverage staff member: in one case a manager and in 
the other case a chef (Interview E, F, 2004).  
 
The General Manager of a state-owned hotel said that foreign training manuals and videos are 
used to try to indoctrinate his staff in international standards of service. In 2004, the Rex Hotel 
received the environmental certificate ISO14001, for which it had been preparing for two years. 
Recognition of the importance of environmental issues to Western guests was a primary impetus 
behind this goal.  In 2004, the Continental Hotel became the second hotel in Vietnam to receive 
the ISO 14001 environmental certificate (Continental Hotel Wins ISO 14001, 2005) and the 
Majestic Hotel has also started working towards this certification. 
 
Long-established state-owned hotels are improving their facilities to keep up with the 
international market. Ho Chi Minh City’s 4-star Rex Hotel plans to open a new 70-room 5-star 
hotel, with a 1000-person conference hall, parking and pool. The hotel has been allocated a 3,000 
square meter site by the municipal People’s Committee (a substantial benefit of running a state-
owned hotel) and will be investing up to VND 300 billion (USD 19.4 million) building new 
facilities (Son Tran, 2003). Older inner-city state-run hotels may be frustrated in their ambitions 
to upgrade due to contextual constraints. The Continental Hotel in the centre of Ho Chi Minh 
City has no space to provide parking, a swimming pool or any other facilities. The hotel was 
built before automobiles and mopeds became ubiquitous on Saigon’s streets. The large windows 
that served to ventilate the building now must be kept closed to keep out the traffic noise and 
pollution but guests still complain about the noise level. Some outmoded state-owned hotels, like 
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the Hoan Kiem and Dan Chu hotels in Hanoi, are planned to be torn down and replaced with new 
four-to-five-star accommodation. 
 
Staffing and Service Reform 
 
Whereas before doi moi only communist party members or those with good government contacts 
were allowed to work in hotels in Vietnam, in part to isolate the general Vietnamese population 
from contact with foreigners, ordinary Vietnamese are now allowed to rent rooms directly to 
foreigners (Interview I, 2004). The state-owned hotels investigated by the first author through 
interviews often have a corps of long-term employees who have been in the hospitality industry, 
or even at the same hotel, for decades. The benefits of long-term staff loyalty notwithstanding, 
these staff members are disadvantaged in that they gained their training and much of their 
experience in a hotel industry that put little emphasis on customer-orientation or accommodating 
foreign guests. New staff members generally have formal education in tourism and hospitality 
from a vocational school and receive on-the-job training from the older staff (Interview F, 2004). 
Many hotels also give their staff foreign language training and other types of courses. This 
applies to all grades of staff from the highest to the lowest. However, as several interviewees 
noted, it is difficult for state-owned hotels to hold on to new staff because foreign-owned and 
joint-venture hotels are able to lure them away with higher salaries. The Deputy Manager of a 
state owned hotel in Hanoi noted that before doi moi, Saigontourism organized only one training 
course with the director of a big Ho Chi Minh City hotel every one or two years for the staff of 
the hotel where she was employed. Since Vietnamtourism Hanoi has entered a joint venture with 
Sofitel Metropol, employees of other Vietnamtourism Hanoi hotels are sometimes sent to the 
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joint-venture hotel to train and to take advantage of the foreign expertise. Staff are also sent to 
Ho Chi Minh City to train because the hotel system in the South is still perceived as superior to 
that in the North (Interview G, 2004). 
 
Some state hotels are expanding the services offered in-house to include amenities such as 
massage and travel services, rather than the rooms-only offering of pre-doi moi. It is common for 
small private operators to offer services and run businesses such as a dance club or gallery inside 
state-owned hotels, providing added income to the hotels through the rent they pay (Interview D, 
H, 2004). 
 
Outlook for the State-owned Sector 
 
 
The ‘Revised National Tourism Plan for Vietnam 2001-2010, Draft Report’ issued by the 
VNAT/UNDP/WTO endorses a continuation of dual private and public ownership, promoting a 
careful and considered approach to privatisation to allow for the establishment of requisite 
regulatory systems and bodies. However, the Draft Report also mentions a three- and five-year 
program for the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that included ‘equitization’ of state 
enterprises by sale of shares, sale or free transfer of some complete SOEs to private interests, 
liquidation of non-performing SOEs and restructuring of the remaining government enterprises 
to enhance their autonomy and accountability (VNAT/UNDP/WTO, 2001: 109, 159). 
 
The state-owned accommodation sector began the post-doi moi period with a strategic advantage 
over the private sector newcomers to the market by virtue of its possession of a number of 
established hotels in historic buildings in good locations in the urban centres of Vietnam. 
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However, competition from foreign joint venture hotels has inspired state hotels to strive for 
improvements in profitability and standard of service and facilities. Many hotels have been 
renovated or newly built to keep up with the demand of the international market. The withdrawal 
of direct government support means that these accommodation providers must operate by 
different economic parameters than in pre-doi moi years, bringing about a change in their 
management culture and service attitude. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Political transition in Vietnam has affected developments in tourism and in the accommodation 
sector in particular in a number of ways. The rise in Vietnam’s attractiveness both as a leisure 
and a business destination in recent years, and the resulting marked increase in tourism numbers, 
can be traced directly back to the declaration of the open door policy in 1986. Aside from the 
sheer rise in numbers, different types of tourists have begun to enter the country since this time. 
The small cohorts of political and industrial tourists from COMECON (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance) countries that came to Vietnam in the pre-doi moi years have been 
replaced by a much broader spectrum of travelers from a far greater number of countries. Table 1 
below gives a summary of the developments discussed in this paper, within the context of 
political and economic events in Vietnam since the beginning of doi moi. 
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political, economic events foreign direct investment FDI in accommodation 
   
1986: introduction of doi moi     
  1987: Law on Foreign Investment and 
first amendment 
  
    1988: average FDI tourism project budget 
USD 1.4 million 
    1989: Saigon Floating Hotel opens   
1990: government declares "Visit 
Vietnam Year" 
  1990: shortage of accommodation 
contributes to failure of "Visit Vietnam 
Year" initiative 
  1992: second amendment, allowing 
FDI in private companies 
1992: Century Saigon Hotel opens. Hotel 
development one of three major FDI areas 
1994: end of US trade embargo on 
Vietnam 
  1994: New World Saigon Hotel opens 
1995: Vietnam enters ASEAN 1995: USD 20.63 total FDI in 
Vietnam since 1987 
1995: Majestic Hotel sets up first sales 
department in a state-owned hotel. average 
FDI tourism project budget USD 66.7 
million 
1996: "social evils" campaign 1996: FDI in Vietnam second highest 
in the world. FDI in Vietnam declines 
for first time. FDI SWOT analysis by 
FIA 
1996: Saigon Floating Hotel closes. Decline 
in FDI especially pronounced in 
accommodation sector 
    early-mid 1990s: accommodation accounts 
for most tourism FDI in Vietnam 
1997: Asian financial crisis                 
  1998: Vietnam FDI promotion 
campaign in Europe 
  
  1999: rule allows foreign investors up 
to 30% stake in some "equitized" 
enterprises 
  
  2000: USD 6.5 billion total revenue 
from FDI projects in Vietnam 
2000: 182 of 194 foreign-invested hotels in 
Vietnam are joint ventures 
    2001: many international hotel chains 
operating in Vietnam. 60% of star-grade 
hotels are SOEs 
  by 2003: investors from 64 countries 
have invested in Vietnam 
  
    2004: Rex Hotel and Continental Hotel 
receive ISO 14001 environmental 
certificate. 239 FDI tourism projects in 
Vietnam with USD 6.1 billion capital 
  2005: more than USD 2 billion FDI 
inVietnam (4% of GDP) 
  
2006: Vietnam's first Tourism 
Law 
  2006: 190 FDI tourism projects in Vietnam 
with USD 4.64 billion capital 
2007: Vietnam admitted to WTO 2007: FDI accounts for 24.8% of total 
investment in Vietnam (nearly double 
2006 amount) 
  
 
Table 1 
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Vietnam’s new membership in ASEAN and its entry into the WTO are signs of the government’s 
eagerness to enter into the global community of nations so long denied it. Reforms in investment 
law and other legislation, aimed at satisfying the requirements of entry into these organizations, 
affect accommodation businesses. The involvement of organizations like the UN, the WTO and 
the UNDP in Vietnam introduces a global perspective to tourism planning and has led to the 
drafting of the country’s first Tourism Law, which took effect in January 2006. 
 
The accommodation sector in Vietnam has had a formative effect on political development in 
many ways during doi moi. Very early in the period after 1986, it became clear that the tourism 
provisions and infrastructure were qualitatively and quantitatively far below what was required 
to satisfy the new types of visitors. Lacking the expertise and finances to transform its tourism 
industry from within, the government resolved to relinquish its monopoly on tourism by courting 
foreign joint venture partners in order to encourage the growth of a free market within which 
state-owned firms competed alongside private sector businesses. Thus a desire to reap maximum 
benefits from tourism led to a compromise of a basic tenet of previous government policy. In 
return, foreign joint ventures have brought international standards to Vietnamese tourism and 
thereby given a new impetus for improvement to state businesses. 
 
Because of FDI, hotels in Vietnam have improved qualitatively and increased quantitatively and 
in size. The incursion of large international hotel chains has inspired state-owned hotels to 
increase in size and improve in terms of service. New kinds of tourists have been arriving in 
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conjunction with new provisions offered by hotels such as conference facilities. FDI has brought 
new management styles and marketing strategies to the accommodation sector in Vietnam. 
 
FDI joint-venture newcomers to the accommodation sector in Vietnam have redefined the market 
parameters and have played a part in encouraging or necessitating reforms in the way state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) operate. State accommodation has been forced to assume a more 
dynamic, customer-oriented stance by the competition brought by joint ventures. Re-
organization, streamlining, equitization and privatisation of state enterprises are some of the 
results of efforts to remain competitive in the market. The opening of markets to foreign direct 
investment in addition to traditional state-owned enterprises has brought about competition, 
consolidation and differentiation in the accommodation sector that did not exist under the 
previous state monopoly. A higher grade of customer-responsiveness and more highly trained 
staff are now in demand to serve this more differentiated and discerning market, and Vietnam’s 
accommodation market is now orienting itself to international standards. These processes in the 
accommodation industry are mirrored by similar transformations in other facets of tourism, and 
there are rich opportunities for further research into the ways in which the involvement of 
foreign interests, expertise and finances are affecting other tourism sub-sectors such as tour 
operators and National Parks. 
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